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Abstract
We formulate and estimate a structural model for travel demand, in which users have hetero-
geneous preferences and make their transport decisions considering the network congestion. A
key component in the model is that users have incomplete information about the preferences of
other users in the network and they behave strategically when they make transportation decisions
(mode and number of trips). Therefore, the congestion level is endogenously determinate in the
equilibrium of the game played by users. For the estimation, we use the rst order conditions of the
usersutility maximization problem to derive the likelihood function and apply Bayesian methods
for inference. Using data from Santiago, Chile, the estimated demand elasticities are consistent
with results reported in the literature and the parameters conrm the e¤ect of the congestion on
the individualspreferences. Finally, we compute optimal nonlinear prices for buses in Santiago,
Chile. As a result, the nonlinear pricing schedule produces total benets slightly greater than the
linear pricing. Also, nonlinear pricing implies fewer individuals making trips by bus, but a higher
number of trips per individual.
This paper was presented in the Kuhmo-Nectar Conference on Transport Economics, Valencia, 2010, as Nonlinear
Pricing in Transportation: An application to transit system of Santiago de Chile.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally, congestion e¤ects have been considered explicitly in transportation analysis by means
of network equilibrium models (e.g. Beckmann et al., 1956; De Cea and Fernández, 2001). In these
models, the only e¤ect of congestion is an increase in travel time and waiting time in the case of a
bus network (e.g., Spiess, 1984; Spiess and Florian, 1989; De Cea and Fernández, 1993). Although the
congestion modeling with network assignment models has been successful, its complexity prevents its
use for the design of some transport policies. For example, to implement optimal pricing, generally
it is used simplied approaches (De Borger, 2001; Van Dender and Proost, 2003; Ahn, 2009; Wang
et al., 2008). Moreover, the network equilibrium approach do not consider other e¤ects than time on
the usersutility and neglects, for instance, any innate aversion to congestion or aversion to pollution
produced by the congestion.
In this paper, we develop a methodology to estimate a travel demand model with endogenous
congestion. In doing so, we recognize that users are heterogeneous in their preferences about trans-
portation. This heterogeneity is modeled by adding an idiosyncratic parameter in the utility function,
which is private information for each agent, but its distribution is common knowledge. In addition,
we recognize that users make travel decisions considering the congestion level or the expected total
number of trips in the network. Thus, individuals behave strategically and maximize their utility.
They play an incomplete information game, in which the strategy is to decide the number of trips in
each available transportation mode. In equilibrium, individual demand depends on the price faced by
each user.
Our methodology takes into consideration two problems. First, the information asymmetry faced
by the social planner designing a pricing policy. Indeed, the planner does not know the userscharac-
teristics, which inuence their transport preferences (e.g., income, subjective value of time, traveling
distances, intrinsic aversion to congestion, etc.). This source of asymmetric information signicantly
a¤ects transportation planning. Even though it has not been explicitly recognized in the practice of
transportation planning1 , modeling methods use demand segmentation according to departure time,
origin and destination, income and car ownership. This allows planners to partially control users
preferences for these attributes.
Second, users might take into account the congestion when making transportation decisions. Indeed,
in order to decide how many trips to make, where to go, and which mode to use, users take into
account the level of congestion in the city or in the route they use. However, they do not know the
travel decisions made by other users. In that case, they play a game of incomplete information.
1For instance, Ortúzar and Willumsen (2002) do not mention problems of asymmetric information in transportation
planning.
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We apply our model to compute optimal nonlinear prices for buses in Santiago. The primary
economic motivation for introducing optimal pricing is that it enhances economic e¢ ciency. Urban
transportation is not an exception to this rule. In particular, the provision of public transportation
services also should be subject to optimal prices. Moreover, as Wilson (1993) remarks, nonlinear
pricing can be used to maximize the consumers net benets from the rmsoperations and therefore
a nonlinear tari¤ minimizes allocative distortions caused by setting prices equal to marginal cost when
the rm is a monopoly.
However, for many years, the economic literature has focused on how to price roads with marginal
costs and to internalize the congestion (Dupuit, 1844; Pigou, 1920; Walters, 1961; De Borger, 2001;
Lindsey and Verhoef, 2001, etc.). By contrast, since public transportation services do not exhibit this
distortion2 , the discussion on optimal fares has been centered on the size of the subsidies and policy
measures to reduce pollution and congestion (e.g., Timilsina and Dulal, 2008).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic theoretical model and the required
conditions for the implementation of a nonlinear pricing scheme (Guesnerie and La¤ont, 1984). We
derive optimal prices for the general case where the users utility depends on the expected number of
the trips on the network.
Section 3 presents the parameterization of the utility function. We adopt a discrete/continuous
choice approach for the parameterization (Hanemann, 1984). This way, the demand functions derived
from the parameterized utility are consistent with observed behavior, such as zero demand for a number
of individuals in one or more modes of transportation. The individual heterogeneity is represented by
an idiosyncratic parameter in the utility function. In addition, the congestion level is endogenously
determinate as the equilibrium of an incomplete information game played by users. For the adopted
parameterization, such equilibrium is the solution of a xed point equation. We prove existence and
uniqueness of the solution. The utility function also satises the implementability conditions for
nonlinear tari¤s (Guesnerie and La¤ont, 1984).
Section 4 describes the statistical model that can accommodate the observed discrete/continuous
choices. In order to derive the likelihood function, we use the rst order condition of the individuals
utility maximization problem (Kim et al., 2002). We assume random components in utility, which
are associated to quality perception of the transport modes. Then, we specify a distribution function
for these components and the corresponding likelihood function. Thus, we obtain an econometric
model which is consistent with the microeconomic model. The heterogeneity is modeled as a random
parameter and its distribution is specied parametrically. Doing so, we obtain an error component
model or mixed model. The estimation procedure is based on Bayesian inference and the Markov
2 In transportation science it is recognized that in the public transportation network there is congestion due to the
limited capacity of the services (De Cea and Fernández, 1993).
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Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method. In particular, the Markov Chain Monte Carlo is implemented to
simulate the parameter posterior distribution. This allows us to avoid the integration of the likelihood
function. In Section 4, we also study the model identication. In this respect, we conclude the model
needs the normalization of one parameter to be identied.
Section 5 reports the results of the application to Santiago de Chile. We use data from Santiago to
estimate the utility function and compute optimal prices, both linear and nonlinear. Concerning the
model estimation, in line with the literature, we nd that transportation demand exhibits low price
elasticity (see Oum and Walter, 2000) and a signicant congestion e¤ect (see Bousquet and Ivaldi,
2001). Regarding the nonlinear pricing schedule, we obtain a signicant quantity discount. The net
benets derived from a nonlinear schedule are slightly higher than those obtained with a linear price.
Also, the total demand is higher under the nonlinear pricing schedule, but it exhibits a lower proportion
of user traveling by bus.
Finally, in Section 6 we conclude and discuss limitations and possible extensions.
2 Theoretical model and optimal prices
2.1 Model and implementability conditions
Consider a pricing policy that recognizes the users are heterogeneous in their preferences. It is assumed
that the regulator (or the planner) knows only the distribution of preferences in the relevant population.
Therefore, the regulator cannot identify the characteristics of the user being served for the purpose of
optimal price discrimination. The regulator must design a price mechanism in which users self-select
according to their individual characteristics by the size of their purchase. Self-selection is induced by
means of a quantity-dependent pricing schedule o¤ered by the rm. The user faces a nonlinear outlay
schedule P (x), where x is the quantity consumed.
Assume that users have preferences depending on a vector of trips by mode of transportation, x;
the expected total number of trips in the network (or the congestion level), X; and nonlinear outlay
schedule, P (). Individuals have unobservable characteristics, which are private information. They
are represented by an idiosyncratic parameter, , continuously distributed with density function f
and support [; ]  R. The preferences are summarized by a utility function U = u(x;X; P ; ). By
assumption, the utility function is strictly increasing and concave on x, strictly decreasing on X and
increasing in .
Consider a static framework where the user maximizes her utility choosing x during a xed period
of time. All users behave strategically and take into account the number of trips chosen by others in
the network at the same period. They do not know the otherspreferences, , with the exception of
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the distribution. The individuals problem is
max
x
u(x;X; P (x); )
s.t. X =
Z 

x(;X; P ())f()d
The solution is a demand function, x(;X; P ()), which depends on , X, and the payment schedule
P (). Notice that the expression for the total number of trips implies a xed point equation. We discuss
this feature in section 3.
The choice problem for the user may be recast in the following form. Rather than o¤ering a
quantity-dependent price schedule P (x), the regulator can o¤er a quantity and payment schedule that
depends on each users declaration of her type, (x(); t()). For any quantity-dependent schedule P (),
it is possible to construct the equivalent revelation schedule. Dene (x; t) by x() = x(;X; P ()) and
t() = P (x(;X; P ())). Thus, the user has the incentive to reveal correctly her type , since (x; t) is
constructed using the demand schedule.
A schedule (x; t) for which the user reveals her type parameter  is referred to as a direct revelation
mechanism. The requirement that truth telling is optimal for users is called incentive compatibility.
Formally, consider the utility dened as U(x;X; t; ), where x is a vector of chosen trips, t is
a monetary transfer, and  is private information representing heterogeneity. A direct revelation
mechanism is implementable if U satises the following conditions (Guesnerie and La¤ont, 1984):
(M) monotonicity : U is strictly decreasing in the transfers;
(D) di¤erentiability : U is continuously di¤erentiable of C2class;
(CS) constant sign of marginal rate of substitution: the sign of the vector @@

@U=@x
@U=@t

remains con-
stant; and
(B) boundary behavior of the utility : for any (x; t; ) 2 X  [; ];9K > 0 such that for t large
enough
@U=@x@U=@t (x;t;)
 6 K jtj ; uniformly in x; .
In addition, if the utility is quasi-linear in the monetary transfers in the form
U(x; t;X; ) = u(x;X; )  t (1)
then the direct mechanism (x(); t()) is incentive compatible if it satises the following constraints
(Guesnerie and La¤ont, 1984)
@u
@x
(x;X; )
dx
d
() =
dt
d
() (IC1) (2)
dx
d
() > 0 (IC2) (3)
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Users participating in the market must obtain positive net surplus. If the opportunity cost of
nonparticipation is normalized to zero, then the individual rationality requires (x; t) to be such that
S()  max
(x;t)
U(x; t;X; )  0
2.2 Optimal pricing schedule
In what follows, we consider that the utility function is separable in trips and expected congestion
level. Therefore
u(x;X; ) = v(x; ) + xw(X)
where w measures the impact of congestion per trip. It satises w(0) = 0; dw=dX  0.
To compute optimal nonlinear pricing schedule, the criterion is the maximization of social net
benets. We consider a Ramsey-type pricing schedule. The social planner obtains revenues from the
operation of the rm and pays the production cost with costly public funds. This means government
needs to collect $(1 + ) in taxes to pay $1 to the rm.
The aggregated consumers surplus is
CS =
Z 

S()f()d =
Z 

[u(x(); X; )  t()]f()d
We consider that the production cost is composed by a xed cost, C0, and constant marginal cost,
c. Therefore the producers surplus is the following
PS =
Z 

[t()  cx()]f()d   C0
With these ingredients, the social planners problem is given by
maxf
(x;t)
CS + (1 + )PSg (4)
s.t:
@u
@x
(x;X; )
dx
d
() =
dt
d
()
dx
d
() > 0
x() > 0
where the constraint x()  0 is a feasibility condition.
To solve the problem, we dene the variable () =
R 

x()f()d. Using the incentive compatibil-
ity condition (IC1), we eliminate the variable t in the problem (4). Then, the problem is transformed
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into
max
x
Z 


v(x(); ) +

1 + 
@u
@
(x(); )H()  cx()

f()d (5)
+()w(())  C0
s.t.
d
d
() = x()f()
dx
d
() > 0
x() > 0
where H()  (1  F ())=f() is the inverse of the hazard rate of .
Ignoring the constraint
dx
d
() > 0 and considering the interior solution for x, the solution of the
problem is given by the following equation
@v
@x
(x; )  
1 + 
@2v
@x@
(x; )H()  c+ w(()) + ()dw
d
(()) = 0 (6)
If the consumer does not take into account the impact of her trips on the congestion level, her
optimal choice is such that
@v
@x
(x; ) + w(X) =
dP
dx
(x)  (x) (7)
From (6), there is a direct relationship between  and x. Let (z) represent minf : x() = zg
(Spulber, 1989). The optimal marginal prices can be expressed as
(x) = c+

1 + 
@2u
@x@
(x; (x))H((x)) + ()
dw
dX
(()) (8)
The marginal price departs from rst best (marginal cost pricing) because of two sources of distor-
tion: asymmetric information and congestion. The second term in the RHS is the source of consumers
informational rent. It is due to the incentive compatibility requirement. Indeed, the agent of type
2 > 1 can always pretend his type is 1, make x(1) trips, pay the price p(1) and thus get a positive
utility. However, the agent of type 1 cannot gain anything by pretending to be type 2 because in
doing so he gets a negative utility. The ability of higher types to behave as lower types is responsible
for their informational rent. This rent is the price that the planner has to pay for higher types to
reveal their information (for details, see Salanie, 1997; La¤ont and Martimort, 2002). In particular,
since H() is decreasing, a higher  implies a lower the rent extracted by the planner. The intuition
behind such reduction is that it is more socially e¢ cient to o¤er a lower marginal price to individuals
who obtain a greater benet for travel (recall we assume U increasing in ). The last term in equation
(8) is the marginal e¤ect of the congestion in the utility. In other words, it is the marginal cost of
congestion. Thus, an optimal pricing schedule internalizes congestion e¤ects.
Here, three remarks are worth making. First, in contrast to standard models of network e¤ects,
trips are consumed in variable quantities by heterogeneous users. Therefore, the magnitude of the
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network e¤ect depends on the total quantity consumed, rather than the total number of users in the
network. Second, the users utility due to network e¤ects depends only on the number of trips and
not on the users type, such as in Sundararajan (2004). Third, in contrast with telecommunication
models, the externality negatively impacts on the utility (such as Hahn, 2003).
3 Empirical model
3.1 Parameterization
In order to calculate nonlinear tari¤s with congestion e¤ects, the model needs to satisfy some conditions:
consistency and tractability of the consumers utility function and private information, together with
the implementability of a nonlinear pricing schedule.
Regarding the rst condition, corner solutions should be admissible. Indeed, some individuals in
the sample choose more than one mode at day when they travel, but they do not use all available
modes. A way of capturing this feature is by specifying a nonlinear separable utility function.
Concerning the second condition, the consumer must be able to maximize her utility and determine
the (perceived) congestion level, under the assumption that the distribution of the private information
is common knowledge. In other words, there must be an equilibrium.
We build on the parametric model of Bousquet and Ivaldis (2001) paper. They model urban
transportation demand, where userspreferences include private information. Furthermore, the level of
utility depends on the total number of trips by car. This variable enters in the utility function through
a quality index, which depends not only on the network congestion, but also on each alternatives
attributes. Users choose the optimal number of trips for each alternative, given the monetary costs and
quality (the congestion level). The authors obtain a closed form for demand functions and congestion.
A limitation of Bousquet and Ivaldis (2001) paper is that the utility function is not well dened
in nil consumption levels, given that it does not admit corner solutions (demand functions are positive
for all price levels). This is not consistent with the usersobserved behavior.
For a set of n available modes with alternative k being the only mode producing the externality,
we dene the utility function as follows
U(x; z) =
nX
i=1
xi(1 +  i + )  (xi + 1)ln(xi + 1) + z (9)
where
 i = i + iE(xk) + "i (10)
The variable x is a vector with non-negative components and represents the number of trips by
mode. Thus, xi corresponds to trips made by mode i.  represents consumersprivate information
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and it has support [; ].  measures the weight of the consumption of a numeraire good z and equals
the marginal utility of income.
The quality index  i depends on observable and unobservable components. In (10), i represents
the observable one. Typically, i captures attributes such as comfort, safety or reliability. The
unobservable part is represented by "i and can be interpreted as taste variation across individuals
or as subjective perception of quality. The standard assumptions are that individuals observe "i, for
all i, but it is private information.
In addition, the quality index includes the e¤ect of the congestion produced by the total demand
of the alternative k, E(xk). More specically, the k-th alternative is car and, therefore, the quality
index depends on the expected value of trips by car. This statistics captures externalities induced by
users choosing trips by car and endured by users of all of the other modes. Thus, it is assumed that
only cars produce congestion. The parameter i measures the impact of such e¤ect in the utility of
the alternative i.
 can be interpreted as a measure of the intrinsic utility obtained from making a trip. Transporta-
tion demand is derived from demand for activities (Ben-Akiva and Bowman, 1998), thus individuals
choose to make a trip because they obtain a positive net utility by doing an activity at the end of the
trip. Indeed, given the price per trip, pi, the rst order conditions of the utility maximization imply
that xi is positive only if  is greater than pi   i. The last term can be interpreted as a generalized
cost for making a trip. Therefore,  is a reservation utility for carrying out the activity that motivates
the trip.
Given the interpretation of , the demand can be segmented according not only to travel modes
but also to trip purpose. That segmentation is part of standard modeling techniques in transportation
planning (Ortúzar and Willumsen, 2003) However, since we have trips data only for one day, there is
not enough variability to estimate a demand system for trips by mode and purpose, and obtain an
accurate estimation of  for each purpose.
The demand functions are as follows
xi = maxfexp (+ i   pi)  1; 0g (11)
From equation (11), E(xk) is the expectation of a truncated random variable and does not have
a closed form. The existence of equilibrium in the individuals utility maximization problem and the
congestion term are stated in a proposition below.
In the model, private information has dimensionN+1 which is represented by the vector (; "1; :::; "N ).
However, it can be reduced to N . To do so, the utility can be written as follows i = + "i. This way,
it resembles the multiproduct nonlinear pricing model of Armstrong (1996). In general, the distribu-
tion of private information is given by the convolution of the distributions of  and "i. In particular,
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we adopt normal distributions for  and "i, for all i, therefore the distribution of  is also normal.
The most important implication of such dimension reduction is that E(xk) is the expectation of a
one-dimension random variable. Next, the proposition states the existence of an equilibrium in the
game played by users.
Proposition 1 Suppose that
a) The utility function is given by expressions (9) and (10),
b)  is distributed in [; ] with a density function f that is common knowledge; and
c) "k distributed in ["k; "k] with a density function gk that is common knowledge, and is independent
of 
Then, if k   + "k and fk denote its density with support [k; k], the externality term, E(xk), is
given by the solution of the equation
E(xk) = e
k+kE(xk) pk
kZ
k
efk()d 
kZ
k
fk()d (12)
where
k =  (k + kE(xk)  pk) (13)
In addition, the solution always exists and is unique.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The parameterization also allows for individual heterogeneity in a discrete form. In Section 5, the
model is estimated taking into account car availability as a source of heterogeneity. In that case, the
parameters associated to the modesquality are di¤erentiated according to car availability. Thus, the
joint distribution of all sources of private information is a mixture distribution. Given equation (10),
we distinguish the j-th alternative j between individuals with available car (cj) and those without
car (ncj ): The probability of being of type , using the notation introduced in Proposition 1, is as
follows
Pr(being type ) = Pr(j =   cj)  Pr(available car) + (14)
Pr(j =   ncj )  Pr(no available car)
= fj (  cj)  q + fj (  ncj )  (1  q)
where q is the probability of being an individual with car. The RHS in the last line of equation (14) is
a mixture distribution. In the application presented later on,  and "j are assumed normal, therefore
the distribution of the individual type is a mixture of normal distributions.
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3.2 Optimal nonlinear price
Next, we apply the results of Section 2 to the model with utility function given by equation (9) and
considering only three alternatives: Mode 1 is car and mode 2 is bus and mode 3 is subway. In the
rst stage, equation (6) is solved on x2(2). Notice that we are only interested in the optimal prices
for public transportation. The optimal number of trips in that mode is given by the following equation
x2(2)= exp

2+2 + 2E(x1)  c2  

1 + 
H(2)

  1 (15)
where E(x1) is given by the solution of the equation (12). Notice the demand function in equation
(15) is the interior solution of the problem (5). Similarly to the demand in equation (11), the demand
function (15) allows for corner solutions. Indeed, users do not make trips by mode 2 if his type
2 = ("2 + )
 is such that (2+2 + 2E(x1)  c2   1+H(2)) = 0. The complete solution for the
optimal demand function is x2(2) = maxfx2(2); 0g.
The result for x2 is used to obtain the marginal price, 2(2) (given 8)
2(x2(2)) = c2 +

1 + 
H()

(16)
The congestion does not have any impact on the optimal marginal price, since it is the automobile
that produces the externality. This is also a result of the linearity and separability assumed in the
utility function.
x2(2) satises the monotonicity constraints (condition (IC2)), given the functional form used here.
Finally, the quasi-linear form of the utility simplies the computation of the nonlinear prices.
However, it rules out income e¤ects. The separability of the utility implies that the demand cross
elasticities are zero. We retain an additive utility structure under the assumption that the utility
derived from one mode is independent of others. The utility function needs to have decreasing marginal
returns to capture satiation.
4 Estimation
In this section, we specify a statistical model that can accommodate both interior and corner solutions.
To estimate the parameters, we use Bayesian inference and the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
method.
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4.1 Likelihood specication
Given the utility function in equation (9), the rst order conditions for the maximization problem
subject to the budget constraint, respect to the alternative i, are
@U
@xi
(x) =  i +    ln(xi + 1) = pi if xi > 0 (17)
@U
@xi
(x) =  i +    ln(xi + 1) < pi if xi = 0 (18)
where  is a Lagrange multiplier and pi is the observed price of mode i. If the numeraire good is
always consumed,  is equal to  (the marginal utility of income). Using the quality index given by
equation (10) and rearranging terms, we obtain
Vi  i + iE(xk) +    ln(xi + 1)  pi =  "i if xi > 0 (19)
Vi  i + iE(xk) +    ln(xi + 1)  pi <  "i if xi = 0 (20)
Equations (19) and (20) are similar to those appearing in standard choice models, where marginal
utility is constant and does not depend on the quantity demanded. However, here marginal utility
depends on quantities because of the non-linearity in the utility function. The goal is to derive the
distribution of observed demand, x. In order to do that, we specify a distribution for the vector of
taste variations, ". We use equations (19) and (20) to obtain the distribution of x by applying the
change-of-variable theorem.
If " follows a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and variance 
, the likelihood
function of the data is a mixture of density ordinates (equation 19) and point masses (equation 20)
corresponding to non zero and zero demand, respectively. Suppose that there are n transportation
modes and the rst m alternatives have non zero demand, the likelihood for one individual is given by
l(x) = Pr(xi > 0; xj = 0; i = 1; ::;m; j = m+ 1; ::; n)
=
 VnZ
 1
:::
 Vm+1Z
 1
( V1; ::; Vm; "m+1; ::; "nj0;
) jJ j d"m+1; ::; d"n (21)
where  is multivariate normal density, Vi = Vi(x; p) and J is the Jacobian, that is Jij = @Vi(x; p)=@xj
with i; j = 1; :::;m, which appears because of the change of variable.
Since the multidimensional integral of the likelihood function (21) cannot be evaluated directly, it
is transformed to the product of two factors -following Kim et al. (2002). The vector of taste variations
is decomposed in "a = ("1; :::; "m)0 and "b = ("m+1; :::; "n)0, such that24"a
"b
35  N
0@240
0
35 ;
24
aa 
ab

ba 
bb
351A
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with "a and "bj"a being normally distributed. "a  N(0;
aa) and "bj"a = Va  N(;) where
 = 
ba

 1
aa Va ,  = 
bb   
ba
 1aa
ab and Va = (V1; :::; Vm)0. Therefore, the likelihood function (21)
can be rewritten as
l(x) = Pr(xi > 0; xj = 0; i = 1; ::;m; j = m+ 1; ::; n) (22)
= "a( V1; ::; Vmj0;
aa) jJ j

 VnZ
 1
:::
 Vm+1Z
 1
"bj"a(vm+1; ::; vnj;) jJ j dvm+1; ::; dvn
4.2 Inference
Our interest is on the point estimation, together with the distribution of . Remember that  and
" capture individualsheterogeneity regarding preferences for transportation, equation (9). However,
due to identication restrictions we are only able to estimate the distribution of .
We estimate a random parameter model in which  distributes according to an unknown distribution
function, which is specied parametrically.
The Bayesian approach is a natural way to estimate a random parameter model, since it considers
the parameters of interest as random variables and it investigates their posterior distributions given
prior information. Moreover, the Bayesian method avoids integrating the likelihood function. In
contrast, maximum likelihood estimation requires integrating out the likelihood function over the
distribution of the random parameters, while simulated maximum likelihood requires that the number
of simulations increases with the number of observations in order to reduce the simulation bias (Train
2003, Gourieroux and Monfort, 2003).
To this end, we formulate a Bayesian hierarchical model (Carlin and Louis, 1996; Gill, 2002) for
an individual h (h = 1; :::;H) as follows
xh  l(xhjph; ; ; ), likelihood function eq. (22)
(; )  N(;)
h  N(; )
  N(m; s)
2  IG(a; b)
where  = (1; 1; :::; n; n; ) is a vector of parameters of the structural model in equation (9) and
  is a vector with the elements of the Cholesky decomposition of 
. We also assume the random
parameter h is normally distributed with parameters  and , which are the parameters of interest.
Likewise,  distributes normally with mean m and variance s
2, and  distributes according to an
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inverted gamma with parameters a and b. These priors for  and  allows to obtain closed expressions
for the posteriors, given a sample of the individual parameter,  (Train, 2003).
The posterior distribution of the parameters is obtained by the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method.
In particular, we use a Gibbs sampling method with a Metropolis step to infer the posterior distribution
of the models parameters (Geweke, 2005). An advantage of the MCMC method is that it allows us to
obtain individual-level estimates for h. Indeed, with the MCMC method we can draw a sample from
the posterior distribution of h conditional on (x1; p1; ; ; ; ). Then, according to Von-Misess
theorem, the mean of this sample is a consistent estimator of h, in the sense of classical estimation
(see Train 2003).
We summarize the simulation procedure, for details see Kim et al. (2002). First, choose initial
parameters 0, 0, 
0
 ,  
0 and hyper-parameters 0, 0 , m, s, a, and b. Compute de congestion e¤ect,
E(xk), for all h, given the initial parameters. Then, repeat for t = 1; :::; (T0 + T1) the following
1. Draw th, h = 1; :::;H, according to random walk Metropolis-Hasting sampling, and using the
individual likelihood, l(xhjph; t 1; t 1; t 1h ), given t 1h , t 1 and  t 1
2. Compute t accorging to the posterior distribution given the sample 
t
h, h = 1; :::;H, 
t 1
 , and
the prior N(m; s)
3. Compute t accorging to the posterior distribution given the sample 
t
h, h = 1; :::;H, 
t
, and
the prior IG(a; b)
4. Draw (t; t) according to random walk Metropolis-Hasting sampling, and using the total likeli-
hood,
Q
h l(xhjph; t 1; t 1; th), given t 1h , t 1 and  t 1
5. Compute the congestion efect, E(xhkjph; t; t; th; t; t), solving the equation (12) for h =
1; :::;H
6. Update t = t+ 1 and go to step 1.
Finally, the estimators are computed as the means and variances of the last T1 drawn parameters.
4.3 Identication
To verify our model is identied we consider only two available alternatives: mode 1 is car and mode 2 is
bus. Trips by car are the only ones producing congestion. Individuals travelling by car or bus undergo
the e¤ects of congestion. In addition, we consider that the vector components of taste variations are
independent, although they have di¤erent variance, denoted by "i . We do not loss generality using
two alternatives because the in case with more modes, which do not produce congestion, we can identify
the especic parameters similarly to the bus parameters.
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The identication is not clear from the frequentist point of view. The problem arise because the
congestion measure, E(x1)3 , is not only a nonlinear function of some structural parameters (1; 1)
and the price p1, but also it is a function of the parameters of the random component distributions
("1 ; ; ). By contrast, according to the Bayesian approach, the model is identied. In fact, Kass
et al. (1998) asserts there is no identication problem for MCMC methods, provide the posterior
is proper. In turn, Geweke (2005) states if the parameter is identied, its mean and variance are
identied. However, these assertions are not free of controversy (for example, see San Martin and
González, 2010). We argue the model is identied because the MCMC method focuses in the data
generating process not marginalized with respect to h (San Martin and González, 2010). Therefore,
we can introduce additional conditions on the parameters which allow us to identify the model.
Considering the model as a system of equations where the depended variable is yi  ln(xi + 1) ,
i = 1; 2, and the independent variables are pi and E(x1) in equation (19). Therefore, under the
distributional assumptions of the previous sections, the statistical model conditional on h for an
individual h choosing both modes is given by
P (yhjph; ; h; "1 ; "2 ; ; ) =
1
"1


yh1   (1 + h + 1E(x1)  ph1)
"1

 (23)
1
"2


yh2   (2 + h + 2E(x1)  ph2)
"2

E(hj; ) =  (24)
V ar(hj; ) = 2 (25)
where  is the standard normal density function.
We say the model is identied if for two vectors (; h; "1 ; "2 ; ; ) and (e;eh; e"1 ; e"2 ; e; e)
such that
P (yhjph; ; h; "1 ; "2 ; ; ) = P (yhjph;e;eh; e"1 ; e"2 ; e; e) (26)
for all (yh; ph), then
(; h; "1 ; "2 ; ; ) = (
e;eh; e"1 ; e"2 ; e; e)
Since the model is parametric and similar to a linear regression, it is straightforward to verify the
identied parameters are , 2, 2, "1 , and "2 . We cannot identify 1 and h separately, thus we
normalize 1 = 1. This normalization is also useful to identify the remaining parameters. Identication
of  and  is due to the indetication of h for all h. In fact, using the conditions (24) and (25) we
3For the sake of exposition we do not write the conditioning variables of the expectation of x. Hereafter, it should
bear in mind this notation.
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have
 = E(hj; ) = E(hje; e) = e
2 = V ar(hj; ) = V ar(hje; e) = e2
Therefore, we identify 1 from the following equation
1E(x1jph1;1; ; ; "1) = e1E(x1jph1; e1; ; ; "1)
As E(x1) is a monotone function of 1 (we prove this in appendix), the last equation implies
1 =
e1.
These results impose a requirement on the data. Indeed, to identify the parameters, it is necessary
that all travelling alternatives are chosen by a subset of individuals in the sample. This does not mean
that individuals have to make trips in all available modes. However, it implies that the likelihood
function should not be only composed by point masses for any alternative. This enables us to apply
eq. (19). Finally, for identication, the individualschoice set should include an alternative una¤ected
by the congestion and with a price ticket varying across the sample.
Finally, we need to impose some restrictions on the original parameters in order to obtain the-
oretically consistent estimates (Train and Sonnier, 2003). These restrictions may be seen as prior
information coming from the theory. The transformations are
i < 0) i =   exp(i) (27)
 > 0)  = exp() (28)
"i > 0) "i= exp("i) (29)
There are no requirements on i, therefore i = i. Condition (27) implies that the congestion has
a negative e¤ect in the utility. Equation (28) comes from the fact that  represents the marginal utility
of income, which is positive. Finally, condition (29) is required because "i is the standard deviation
of "i. Then, the vector  distributes according to a normal with mean 0 and variance matrix 0 .
4.4 Alternative estimation approaches
Bousquet and Ivaldi (2001) assume that there are two types of simultaneous individual decisions.
Given the congestion level and the travel cost, the user chooses the number of trips in each mode of
transportation. The optimal number of trips is used to obtain the conditional indirect utility function.
The choice of transportation modes, x, is determined by this conditional maximum level of utility.
The authors also assume that the number of trips distributes double Poisson and the indirect utility
functions are observed with a certain degree of error, which distributes according to an Extreme Value
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distribution Type I, producing choice probabilities with a multinomial logit form. This approach
corresponds to the discrete/continuous demand modeling (Hanemann, 1984). However, it does not
take into account the relationship between the distribution of the error term in the utility function (in
the discrete choice level) and the distribution of the quantity consumed (in the continuous decision
level), in contrast to Hanemann (1984), and Dubin and McFadden (1984).
Nevertheless, a correctly specied discrete/continuous model according to Hanemann (1984) is not
useful because the modes are not perfect substitutes. Indeed, there are individuals in the sample
who choose simultaneously two or more transportation modes, but the Hanemanns models consider
situations where only one alternative is chosen.
Finally, another equivalent approach is the estimation of a system of demands with truncated
regression. However, two remarks should be made. On the one hand, if the utility function specication
does not allow for an analytic expression of the demand function, the approach is not useful. On the
other hand, a exible demand function may not be totally, theoretically consistent with the underlying
utility function. By contrast, the approach adopted in this paper satises theoretical consistency.
5 Application to Santiago
This section presents the estimation results using data from Santiago de Chile and the computation
of nonlinear prices. We assume that there are three available transportation modes: car, bus, and
subway. Cars are supposed to produce congestion in the road network, which is undergone by both
car and bus users. The optimal nonlinear prices are calculated for public transportation applying the
results of Section 4.
5.1 Data
We use data provided by the travel survey "Encuesta Origen-Destino de Viajes de Santiago" ("Origin
and Destination Travel Survey of Santiago"), carried out by the National Agency of Transportation
Planning (Sectra, 2002). A total of 15,537 households were surveyed, out of which 12,346 correspond
to surveys conducted during the normal season and 3,191 to the summer season. The survey gathers
information about households (e.g. number of individuals in the household, total income, number of
vehicles, etc.), households members (e.g. age, type of job or study, driving license, etc.), and trips
made during a day by each member of the household (departure time, arrival time, origin, destination,
mode, price ticket, parking cost, walking time and distance, etc.). Some descriptive statistics for the
sample are provided in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1
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Characteristics of households and persons
in the survey
Households 14,152
Mean household size 4.0 pers/hh
Mean household income 515.9 Ch$ 103
Mean income per capita 128.9 Ch$ 103
Households with car 33 %
Mean cars per household 0.4 car/hh
Persons 43,692
Workers 44.9 %
Students 29.6 %
With driving license 26.0 %
Table 2
Characteristics of the trips in the sample
Trips Trips/person Mean travel time Mean distance
(min.) (km.)
All modes 147,872 3.39 26.5 4.7
Car 20,345 3.67 27.3 6.4
Bus 40,244 2.12 45.7 8.4
Subway 4,805 1.75 43.1 9.5
Walking 56,573 2.94 11.1 0.8
Bicycle 3,343 2.44 18.7 2.3
To estimate, we consider only information gathered in the normal season from individuals making
at least one trip by car, bus, or subway, except students. In addition, we exclude all information coming
from combining modes. This results in a sample of 10,866 individuals and 36,613 trips, from which
10,245 are made by car, 16,907 by bus, 2,034 by subway, and 6,579 by non-motorized modes (walking
and/or bicycle). For estimation, we also use expansion factors in order to represent the population.
The expanded sample represents 1,693,591 individuals.
The price of a car trip is calculated as a function of travel distance, gasoline consumption per
kilometre and fuel price. For individuals in the sample making trips by car, the price of a trip was
calculated as the average cost. For those who do not report trips by car, the price is estimated as a
function of the average travel distance by bus.
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The price of the bus ticket is included in the data for those individuals that report travelling by
bus. For individuals that declare not to travel by bus, the price ticket was imputed.4
5.2 Parameter estimation
In addition to the heterogeneity represented by  and ", the model includes a discrete source of
heterogeneity to capture di¤erences between individuals with availability of car or not. Individuals with
di¤erent choice sets value the alternatives in a di¤erent scale. Typically, the transportation demand
analysis has segmented the demand according to car ownership or availability (Ortúzar and Willumsen,
2003; Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985), which implies estimating a model for each segment and assuming
that the social planner (who uses the model for policy design) is able to segment the population. The
approach adopted here does not need to segment the population because car availability is private
information and its distribution is estimated only.
The set of parameters of the utility function di¤ers if the individual has an available car or not.
Consider the dichotomous variable car 2 f0; 1g, which takes value one for individuals with available
car and zero otherwise. The models to estimate are reected on the following equations
U(x; z) =
nX
i=1
xi(1 +  i + )  (xi + 1)ln(xi + 1) + z
Model 1 :  i = i + "i (30)
Model 2 :  i = car(
c
i + 
c
iE(xk)) + (1  car)(nci + nci E(xk)) + "i (31)
Thus, the model is estimated with di¤erent quality indexes for bus and subway according to car
availability.
The distribution of car availability in the population is not estimated simultaneously with the
parameters of the model, but it is estimated from a sample of individuals. Since the distribution of
such a variable is given by the fraction of individuals with car in the population, the same fraction in
the sample is a consistent estimator.
As a rst analysis, we especify a general variance matrix for ", but the Markov chain did not
converge. This is due to the data do not allow us to indentify all the parameters in the matrix, mainly
because there is no individual choosing the three availables modes. Similar fails in identication occur
with error component logit-mixture models (Walker et al., 2007). Thus, we normalize the variance
matrix of " with the restriction "1 = 1.
The results for the two models are presented in Table 3. Model 1, in the rst two columns, does not
include the congestion e¤ect, but it includes discrete heterogeneity due to car availability. Therefore,
the parameters of the quality index are di¤erentiated with respect to that characteristic. In the third
4This price is at (it does not vary with distance nor with time schedules) and only unitary tickets are charged.
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and fourth columns, Model 2 considers the discrete heterogeneity and congestion e¤ects. Table 3 also
includes the likelihood ratio tests under the null hypotheses: (H10) no congestion e¤ects (Model 1 vs.
Model 2). Regarding the nal value of the likelihood function, Model 2 is better than Model 1. The
likelihood ratio tests reject both null hypotheses with high condence level.
The standard errors of the parameters  conrm the hypothesis that individuals take into ac-
count congestion when making their decisions. The same is true with the likelihood ratio test for the
hypothesis H10.
Table 3
Estimated parameters of utility function
Model 1 Model 2
Param. Std. err. Param. Std. err.
 1.2747 0.00041 1.8546 0.00062
 0.0304 0.00004 0.0286 0.00004
 0.0027 0.00000 0.0057 0.00001
1 0 - 0 -
car2 -0.6753 0.00063 -0.4935 0.00079
nocar2 -0.1331 0.00051 -0.4002 0.00047
car3 -3.3873 0.00187 -3.8893 0.00076
nocar3 -2.7897 0.00155 -3.3368 0.00152
1 -0.3390 0.00029
car2 -0.4778 0.00064
nocar2 -0.1548 0.00016
 11 1 - 1 -
 21 -0.1564 0.00017 -0.1518 0.00015
 22 0.4217 0.00014 0.4228 0.00014
 31 -0.9378 0.00081 -0.9902 0.00073
 32 -1.1795 0.00065 -1.2101 0.00047
 33 0.1981 0.00036 0.2292 0.00028
Sim. log-lik. -132,013 -131,866
LRT(H10) (Model 1/Model 2) 293
Table 4 shows the variance matrix of " in the case of Model 2. This matrix is computed with the
estimates of the Cholesky decomposition,  .
Model 2 has a marginal utility of income (parameter ) consistent with the literature. Indeed,
according to this specication, the demand price elasticities (in absolute value) are 0.211, 0.165, and
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0.171 for car, bus and subway, respectively. They are calculated using  and the sample mean of the
prices, since the elasticities are linear in such variables. Oum and Waters (2000) summarize demand
elasticities for transport of passengers estimated in several studies. They report demand elasticities
for trips by automobile in the range of (in absolute value) 0.00-0.52 and for trips by bus in the range
of 0.01-0.96.
The estimation results are in line with what is expected ex ante. For example, the values of the
parameters , which represent the perceived quality of each alternative, imply that car is the best
quality mode and subway is the worst mode. However, note that these parameters take into account
access time as part of the unobservable quality. Since the subway network is small with respect to
the bus network, the subway access time negatively a¤ects the quality of the service. This feature
is present in the two models. Regarding the value of  in Model 2, the congestion matters more for
individuals with available car.
Heterogeneity is statistically signicant (see the value of standard error of ). However, the value
of the coe¢ cient estimated is very small. This may be due to the fact that we have xed the variance
of "1 equal to one. The consequence of such a parameterization is that we impose a total variance
equal to (1 + 2)
5 . The estimated  may imply that the heterogeneity in the population is less or
equal to one.
Finally, we compute the correlation between the observed trips and the modeled ones. In the case
of trips by car, the correlation is 0.64. For bus trips the correlation is 0.43. Figures 1 and 2 show the
observed and modeled trips for car and bus, respectively.
Table 4
Variance matrix of "
"1 "2 "3
"1 1.000
"2 -0.152 0.202
"3 -0.990 -0.361 2.497
5.3 Optimal prices
Nonlinear prices for public transportation are calculated based on the former Model 2. Given that the
selected model includes three sources of private information, the distribution of an arbitrary type, ,
in the population is given by the mixture distribution in equation (14).
Since the parameters  and "2 are assumed normally distributed with support on R,  -which
represents private information- is also distributed on R. The numerical solution of equations (15) and
5Recall that the heterogeneity is represented by the parameters  and ".
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(16) are badly behaved in the tail of the distribution, which results in the need to dene a closed interval
for the support of . Based on some robustness tests, we dene the support as [   3:5( + "2);
 + 3:5( + "2)]. This interval leaves out only 0.1% of individuals. Thus, we neglect the impact of
changing the support of .
The planners problem requires knowing the marginal cost of a trip by public transportation in
Santiago. According to the National Agency of Transportation Planning, the average cost per trip is
Ch$2156 (Sectra, 2002). If we consider that the capacity of the system is constant, the marginal cost
per passenger is small compared to xed costs (capital cost of the vehicle, fuel cost, drivers wage).
We assume a marginal cost equal to 20% of the average cost. We also need to assume a cost of public
funds, (1 + ), which is set in 1.5.
In order for (15) to satisfy the non negativity constraint in the planners problem (5), we need to
nd  such that x() = 0.7 We dene the solution ~x() = max(0; x()). In this case,  = 0:69.
Implementing optimal nonlinear tari¤s requires taking into account that trips are discrete. There-
fore, the optimal price is estimated for a menu of bus tickets. Table 5 presents the nal optimal menu.
The actual price ticket in the bus system of Santiago is approximately 290 (Ch$). Therefore, the
optimal nonlinear prices are far higher than the fare actually charged. The optimal linear prices is 433
(Ch$). These pricing schedules seem to be politically infeasible.
Table 5
Optimal menu of bus tickets ( = 0:5)
Ticket Price (Ch$)
1 trip 820
2 trips 1,250
3 trips 1,550
4 trips 1,780
Daily 1,970
We compare the benets of actual and optimal pricing schedules, both linear and nonlinear. Table
6 shows the mean of the expected benets, consumer surplus and net revenues. Regarding total
benets, nonlinear prices are better with respect to actual ones. However, regarding consumer surplus,
the results are reversed. The actual linear price is better. This reveals that the high total benets
obtained with nonlinear prices are mainly due to the net revenues from the operation of the rm.
Under a public nancing scheme, having positive net revenues is equivalent to collecting public
funds using the transit system. Therefore, the pricing schedule becomes a tax, which is not designed
6Ch$ denotes the Chilean currency, Peso. In 2001, 1 US$ = 630 Ch$
7 In the genal case, this require solving an optimal control problem with bounded control (Kamien and Schwartz,
1991)
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for that purpose. From a mathematical point of view, it is inconsistent that the planners budget
constraint does not bind and the Lagranges multiplier, , is di¤erent from zero. Therefore, in the
planners problem, the net revenues have a weight higher than the optimal one. In order to overcome
this inconsistency, we solve the planners problem (4) considering  as a variable. In the optimum, 
should be non zero and the budget constraint should be binding.
Table 6
Benets under di¤erent pricing schedules ( = 0:5)
Pricing schedule Total benets (Ch$) Consumer surplus (Ch$) Net revenues (Ch$)
Marginal-cost price 2,197 2,635 -292
Actual linear price 2,413 2,028 257
Optimal linear price 2,443 1,727 477
Optimal nonlinear prices 2,563 1,497 711
In this case, the non negativity constraint implies that the  = 0:32, such that x() = 0. The
Lagrange multiplier is  = 0:036. Figure 3 in the upper panel shows the optimal number of trips as a
function of the individuals type, together with di¤erent pricing schedules as a function of number of
trips (lower panel). Table 7 shows the menu of optimal prices.
Table 7
Optimal menu of bus tickets ( = 0:036)
Ticket Price (Ch$)
1 trip 280
2 trips 390
3 trips 460
4 trips 530
Daily 690
We solve the planners problem for a linear price. The optimal price in this case is 162 (Ch$) and
the Lagranges multiplier is  = 0:105.
Again, we compare total benets, consumer surplus, and net revenues for both the optimal nonlinear
and linear pricing schedule (see Table 8). Nonlinear prices are slightly better with respect to linear
ones. Even though both nonlinear and linear pricing produce total benets similar to marginal cost
pricing, they do not require subsidies. However, if we consider the value of public funds is 1.5, in the
case of marginal cost pricing, the total benets reduce to 2,194 (Ch$). This implies that with optimal
pricing schedules we obtain total benets 6% higher. Moreover, with optimal pricing the consumers
surplus is 15% higher than the actual pricing.
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In addition, we compare the total demand under di¤erent pricing schedules, taking into account
the demand for public transportation and the number of individuals choosing public transportation.
Table 9 shows the demands under linear and nonlinear pricing.
There is a trade-o¤ between economic e¢ ciency and exclusion of the market. Indeed, the optimal
nonlinear price exhibits the highest benets and the lowest participation. Despite the fact that demand
in the linear pricing schedule is lower than in the nonlinear one, the exclusion is higher in the latter
case. This means there are more trips per user under the nonlinear pricing.
Table 8
Benets under di¤erent pricing schedules and  is optimally determined
Pricing schedule Total benets (Ch$) Consumer surplus (Ch$) Net revenues (Ch$)
Marginal-cost price 2,330 2,632 -292
Actual linear price 2,291 2,023 256
Optimal linear price 2,326 2,326 0
Optimal nonlinear prices 2,336 2,336 0
Table 9
Demand under di¤erent pricing schedules and  is optimally determined
Pricing schedule Mean of trips Individuals choosing bus (%)
Marginal-cost price 2.70 100
Actual linear price 2.22 99
Optimal linear price 2.46 99
Optimal nonlinear prices 2.62 98
6 Final comments
This methodology to model transportation demand with endogenous congestion should be considered
as a rst step in this type of models. It may be extended to consider more complex behavior. For
instance, it is possible to model mode and destination choice under a discrete choice framework with
endogenous congestion. This way, the model would be in line with traditional transportation demand
modeling. Also, departure time choice is an interesting problem to consider endogenous congestion
e¤ects.
Even though our results depend on the parametric assumtions adopted, it is possible to extend
some of them to more general settings. In particular, we have preliminary the results concerning to
equlibrium existence with more general utility functions. However, model identication is strongly
dependent on the parameterization and it requires specic analysis.
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To our knowledge, no study has used a similar approach to compute optimal nonlinear prices for
bus services. There exist two main approaches to compute optimal prices in transportation services:
the demand-based and the network equilibrium-based approach. Our methodology belongs to the rst
group. However, it has the advantage that it takes into account congestion e¤ect, which makes it more
general (as in the second group). Although, such network models can take into account the congestion
e¤ects, the computation of optimal prices requires solving a mathematical program with equilibrium
constraints. Thus, such an approach seems to be unfeasible in a city as big as Santiago.
Our model makes some simplifying assumptions to compute optimal prices. One of them is utility
separability, which implies a negligible substitutability between modes. Nevertheless, transportation
demand analysis recognizes that di¤erent modes are indeed substitutes and that cross price elasticities
are signicant. If this is the case, the demand for public transportation depends on the demand for
trips by car. Then, optimal bus fares have an indirect e¤ect through the congestion level. This is an
issue for research in a next stage.
Linearity in the utility of the numeraire good implies a nil income e¤ect. Such an e¤ect may
be relevant for individuals with low income, for whom transportation expenditure represents a high
proportion of their budget. However, this assumption simplies the computation of nonlinear prices.
Finally, frurther analysis has to be done on the estimation of marginal costs. Here, we use an
existing estimation of the average cost. Indeed, a deeper analysis of such a variable exceeds the scope
of this work.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1.
Consider the function g(z), z 2 R+, dened by
g(z) = ea+z
Z
 (a+z)
ef()d 
Z
 (a+z)
f()d
where f is a density function with support [; ],  <  a <  and  < 0.
From the denition follows that g is a continuous function and is also monotonically decreasing.
Indeed
g0(z) = ea+z
Z
 (a+z)
ef()d < 0 8z
To prove the existence of a solution of the xed point equation given by (12) it su¢ ce show that
g(0) > 0 and there exists z > 0 such that g(z) = 0. Indeed,
g(0) = ea
Z
 a
ef()d 
Z
 a
f()d
=
Z
 a

ea+ 1 f()d
> 0
since ea+ 1 is positive for all  >  a.
Now, consider z =  ( + a)= > 0 then
g(z) = ea+z
Z
 (a+z)
ef()d 
Z
 (a+z)
f()d
= e 
Z

ef()d 
Z

f()d
= 0
The uniqueness of the solution results from monotonicity of g.
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Appendix B
Derivatives of congestion with respect to the parameters of the model
Consider the function z : Rd  R+ ! R+, such that (x; ) ! z(x), dened implicitly by the
equation
z = eg(x;z)
Z
 g(x;z)
ef(j)d 
Z
 g(x;z)
f(j)d (A.1)
where f is a density function conditional in  with support [; ] and g is a continuous real-valued
function dened over X  R+, with X  Rd
Consider that the function g is such that eq. (A.1) there exist a solution for all x  X. We can
apply implicit derivation and the Leibnizs rule for di¤erentiation under the integral sign. Then, the
derivative of z with respecto to xi is given by
@z
@xi
(x) =
@g
@xi
(x; z)F (g(x; z); )

1  @g
@z
(x; z)F (g(x; z); )
 1
(A.2)
where
F (y; ) = ey
Z
 y
ef(j)d
Consider x = (1; 1; ; p1), z = X1 and g(x; z) = 1 + 1X1   p1, with  < 0. Then, applying
eq. (A.2), it follows
@X1
@1
= F (1 + 1X1   p1; ) [1  F (1 + 1X1   p1; )] 1 > 0
@X1
@1
= X1F (1 + 1X1   p1; ) [1  F (1 + 1X1   p1; )] 1 > 0
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Figure 1: Comparison of real and modeled trips by car
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Figure 2: Comparison of real and modeled trips by bus
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Figure 3: Trips as a function of individuals type (upper panel) and pricing schedules (lower panel)
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